Title: Efectos de las políticas y prácticas de gobierno corporativo sobre la estructura de propiedad: evidencia de compañías chilenas
Other Titles: Effects of Corporate Policies and Governance Practices on Ownership Structure: Evidence from Chilean Firms
Authors: Muñoz Mendoza, Jorge Andrés
Sepúlveda Yelpo, Sandra María
Veloso Ramos, Carmen Lissette
Issue Date: Dec-2018
Publisher: Universidad Católica de Colombia. Facultad de Economía
Citation: Muñoz Mendoza, J., Sepúlveda Yelpo, S., y Veloso Ramos, C. (2018). Efectos de las políticas corporativas y las prácticas de gobierno en la estructura de propiedad: evidencia de empresas chilenas. Revista Finanzas y Política Económica, 10 (2), 269-286. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.14718/revfinanzpolitecon.2018.10.2.2
Abstract: Este artículo se propone analizar el impacto de las políticas de financiamiento, dividendos y gobierno corporativo sobre la estructura de propiedad en compañías chilenas. Se usó una muestra de 185 compañías listadas en la Bolsa de Comercio de Santiago, que contestaron la encuesta NCG 341 sobre Prácticas de Gobierno Corporativo en 2013. Los resultados de las regresiones Tobit de dos límites (TLTR) demuestran que las políticas de endeudamiento y de dividendos negativamente afectan la propiedad de los accionistas controladores y protegen los derechos de los accionistas minoritarios al complementar su rol de monitoreo. Las prácticas de gobierno corporativo tienen efectos significativos sobre la estructura de propiedad de las compañías chilenas.
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URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10983/22790
ISSN: 2248-6046
Is part of: Revista Finanzas y Política Económica, Vol. 10, no. 2 (jul. – dic. 2018); p. 269 – 286.
Appears in Collections:CAD. Finanzas y Política Económica

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