Title: | Ciclos políticos e independencia del Banco Central Central Bank Independence and the Business Cycle |
Authors: | Gómez Ríos, John Jairo Urueña, Juan Carlos Mayorga, Nasly Esperanza |
Keywords: | CICLOS POLÍTICA MONETARIA INFLACIÓN COLOMBIA POLITICA MONETARIA-COLOMBIA INFLACION-COLOMBIA BANCOS CENTRALES |
Issue Date: | Aug-2009 |
Citation: | Gómez Ríos, J. J., Urueña, J. C. & Mayorga, N. E. (2009). Ciclos políticos e independencia del Banco Central. Studiositas, Vol. 4 (2) |
Abstract: | Un tema que ha sido ampliamente debatido en la literatura económica es el relacionado con la independencia del Banco Central. Se cree que un Banco Central, política y económicamente independiente, favorece las tasas de inflación relativamente bajas y estables. El artículo analiza el procedimiento que debería aplicarse para medir el grado de autonomía, legal y efectiva, del Banco de la República (Banco Central de Colombia), así como sus efectos sobre el ciclo político según la metodología adoptada por Alex CUKIERMAN (2006) One issue that has been widely debated in economic literature is related to the independence of the Central Bank. It is believed that a central bank, politically and economically independent, favors inflation rates relatively low and stable. In the present investigation is the procedure to be applied to measure the degree of autonomy, legal and effective, the Bank of the Republic (Central Bank of Colombia) and its effects on the political cycle according to the methodology adopted by Alex CUKIERMAN (2006) |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/10983/550 |
ISSN: | 1909 - 0366 |
Is part of: | Revista studiositas, Vol. 4 no. 2 (ago. 2009); p. 77-83 |
Appears in Collections: | CAJ. Studiositas |
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File | Description | Size | Format | |
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Stud_4-2_A06_gomez-uruena-mayorga.pdf | 113.64 kB | Adobe PDF | ![]() View/Open |
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